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I. Introduction
The "second ghetto" did not just happen. It was willed into existence.'
Tsunami.2 Avalanche.3 Cliff.4 Whether geological or meteorological, the
metaphors of catastrophe have flooded the discourse regarding the antici-
pated surges of evictions during the Pandemic of 2020. It is striking how
we refer to a loss of home for so many in terms of imminent phenomena
over which we have no control.
Of course, we do control this denouement o the scarcity and instability
of affordable housing in this country. We built it; we broke it; we bought
it. One of the many themes in Arnold Hirsch's Making the Second Ghetto,
to which the title of this essay alludes, is that there was nothing natural
or inevitable about the violent racial segregation of mid-century inner cit-
ies. Purposeful local, state, and federal policies produced those results, and
they produced what we see now.
Given our collective responsibility, one might hope that the impending
evictions of thirty million tenants, and the homelessness of tens of thou-
sands more,6 might focus the collective mind wonderfully. Instead, the
1. ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE & HOUSING IN CHICAGO
1940-1960, at x (2d ed. 1998).
2. Katy O'Donnell, Black Community Braces for Next Threat: Mass Evictions, POLITICO
(June 12, 2020) ("Unless Congress intervenes soon, the coming tsunami of evictions and
homelessness will disproportionately harm black and brown people" (quoting Diane
Yentel, president and CEO of the National Low Income Housing Coalition)), https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/06/12/mass-evictions-314699.
3. Sarah Mervosh, An 'Avalanche of Evictions' Could Be Bearing Down on America's Rent-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020) (quoting Professor Emily Benfer, Columbia Law School),
https: / /www.nytimes.com/2020 /05 /27/us/ coronavirus-evictions-renters.html.
4. Talia Richman & Wilborn P. Nobles III, Losing Homes Scares Many, BALT. SUN (July 5,
2020), https://digitaledition.baltimoresun.com/infinity/article-share.aspx?guid=21bf
6487-8fdf-4cc0-9d8e-6dc2b51eeOf8, (quoting Karen Wabeke, Homeless Persons Represen-
tation Project, "Every day is a day closer to this cliff when a lot of the protections and
measures all will be ending.").
5. I challenge the reader to identify all the natural disaster-related metaphors in this
essay, none of them planted deliberately. They are simply impossible to avoid. In dis-
claiming agency for this human disaster, the discourse of natural disaster expresses the
irresponsibility of this moment perfectly. Since I submitted the first draft of this article,
as state-based eviction moratoria and enhanced unemployment benefits expire with no
immediate hope of renewal, the trend in disaster-related characterization has become so
pronounced that others have taken note. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Millions of Evictions
Are a Sharper Threat as Government Support Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https: / /www
.nytimes.com/2020 /08 /07/business/economy/housing-economy-eviction-renters.html
(noting that the simultaneous lapse of the federal moratorium on evictions and of the
enhanced federal unemployment benefits has contributed to experts' reliance on meta-
phors of natural disaster).
6. EMILY BENFER ET AL., ASPEN INST., THE COvID-19 EVICTION CRISIS: AN ESTIMATED
30-40 MILLION PEOPLE IN AMERICAARE AT RISK (Aug.7,2020),https://www.aspeninstitute
.org/blog-posts/the-covid-9-eviction-crisis-an-estimated-30-40-million-people-in
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relief response so far has been jagged and uncoordinated, following the
usual fault lines. States and local governments have heeded the pressing
demands to postpone the obligation to pay rent. But moratoria on evictions
for nonpayment of rent expire; they apply unevenly, state by state.' As of
this writing, prohibitions on evictions from federally supported housing
expired at the end of July 2020, with extended restrictions for tenants of
multifamily housing financed by federally guaranteed loans.8 "Cancel the
rent" campaigns recognize the reality that jobs lost may not return before
the rent comes due again.
The focus on forestalling evictions and mortgage defaults disregards the
structural underpinnings of distress, and in doing so, guarantees that the
efforts will come up short. Rent-based solutions to the horror of mass evic-
tion avoid the question of "who pays?" Rental properties incur inexorable
expenses; for some owners, rents are the primary sources of income with
which to pay these expenses. While it is understandable that legislators
give landlords a distant second thought, habitability costs money. So far,
that relief has arrived in the form of mortgage forbearance, a remedy that is
available only to those property owners with federally backed mortgages.9
Residential as well as commercial property owners eventually must pay
property taxes, lest they push the pain along to state and local govern-
ments that are starving for funds.'
One could never claim that the pain of the owner of a rental building
equals the pain of the renter who lives in it. Yet both suffer within an eco-
system of housing instability and insecurity. I will focus on the place in
this ecosystem of the small landlord, the owner-manager of unsubsidized
buildings of somewhere between one and five units." According to one
source, these buildings represent the majority of housing renting for less
-america-are-at-risk (estimating that, of the thirty to forty million evictions predicted,
Black and Latinx renters will be disproportionately affected); see also COMMUNITY SOLU-
TIONS, ANALYSIS ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROJECTS 40-45% INCREASE IN HOMELESSNESS THIS
YEAR (May 11, 2020), https://community.solutions/analysis-on-unemployment-projects
-40-45-increase-in-homelessness-this-year (extrapolating an increase in the number of
homeless persons to a total of 800,000, based on anticipated increase in joblessness).
7. EVICTION LAB, COvID-19 POLICY SCORECARD, HTTPS://EVICTIONLAB.ORG/COVID
-POLICY-SCORECARD/#SCORECARD-INTRO. As of this writing, in July, 2020, thirty-one states
had lifted their restrictions on evictions.
8. Brittany Hutson, As Moratoriums Start to Lift, Preparing for an Eviction Wave,
SHELTERFORCE (June 25, 2020), https://shelterforce.org/2020/06/25/as-moratoriums
-start-to-lift-preparing-for-an-eviction-wave.
9. See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, FHFA PROVIDES TENANT PROTECTIONS (June 29,
2020), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Provides-Tenant
-Protections.aspx (extending forbearance to six months for servicers of mortgages backed
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with accompanying prohibitions on evictions).
10. Richman & Nobles III, supra note 4 (quoting Del. Kumar Barve, D. Montgomery
County, Md.: "We don't want an eviction tsunami. We don't want to hurt the business
community either").
11. For a discussion of the elusive definition of "small," see text at Section II, infra.
159
160 Journal of Affordable Housing
than $750 per month.'2 They also represent the housing for a significant
proportion of the renters most at risk for losing their jobs, and thus the
housing most at risk for losing financial support.3 Owners of color and
immigrants disproportionately own small buildings, and renters of color
disproportionately live in them.
These properties lie within the larger category of real estate known as
"Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing." "NOAH" buildings represent
both the most and the least stable of rental housing options: the most sta-
ble, because, like the poor, unsubsidized low rent housing has been always
with us; the least stable for the individual renter, because NOAH units may
operate outside any mandated rent structure and outside the confines of
leases. I will address how this historic mainstay of affordable housing stock
struggles on, perpetually at risk, maligned and ignored; how racial dis-
crimination sustains it; and what the pandemic exposes about its fragility.
II. The World We Know So Little About: Small-Scale Rental
Property Owners and the Housing They Provide
A. Why a Look at Small Landlords and Small Buildings
There is no official definition of "small" building. Researchers note that
buildings of between one and five units are commonly characterized as
"small." 4 Small buildings sometimes are defined in the negative: by what
they are exempt from. Rental buildings of one to four units may be exempt
from rent stabilization, and even from local measures to provide relief to
renters during the pandemic.5
The importance of small buildings in this discussion relates back to their
prominence in the affordable housing ecosystem. They constitute a subset
12. Whitney Airgood-Obrycki & Alexander Herrman, Covid-19 Rent Shortfalls in Small
Buildings, JT. CTR. HOUSING STUD., HARV. U. (May 26, 2020), https://www.jchs.harvard
.edu/blog/covid-19-rent-shortfalls-in-small-buildings; JT. CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD., HARV.
U., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING 2020, at 17 (June 2020), HTTPS://WWW.JCHS.HARVARD
.EDU/SITES /DEFAULT/FILES/HARVARDJCHSAMERICAS_RENTAL_HOUSING_2020.PDF
(noting that two-to-four unit buildings constitute a "disproportionate share of the low-
and moderate-cost housing stock," with nineteen percent of units renting at $600 or less,
and twenty-one percent of units renting between $600 and $799).
13. Airgood-Obrycki & Herrman, supra note 12 (noting that households in thirty-one
percent of single-family rental dwellings, and in twenty-nine percent of small multi-
family buildings, are at risk for job loss as a result of the pandemic; and that fifty-one per-
cent of households renting in small multi-family buildings are headed by people of color).
14. PHILIP GARBODEN ET AL., HUD USER, URBAN LANDLORDS AND THE HOUSING
CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM: A RESEARCH REPORT 9 n.13 (May 2018), https://www
.huduser.gov/portal/publications/UrbanLandlords.html.
15. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §42-3502.05(a)(3)(A)(2020)(exempting buildings of four or
fewer units, owned by four or fewer "natural persons," from registration under rent stabi-
lization); D.C. ACT 23-317, §8(g)(2) (May 13, 2020), https:/ /lims.dccouncil.us/downloads
/LIMS/44622/Signed_Act/B23-0750-SignedAct.pdf (limiting to owners of five or more
units the requirement that landlords offer payment plans to tenants).
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of NOAH stock. As there is no institutional or governmental definition
of "small" building, there is no obvious point of origin for "NOAH." The
acronym has appeared in newspaper articles16 and in affordable housing
publications.7 Writers have characterized NOAH as unsubsidized, bare-
bones rental housing of at least two decades vintage.18 Others refer to it as
"missing middle" housing, affordable to those who are neither very rich
nor very poor. 19
Numbers of NOAH units are hard to pin down, just as are definitions
of affordability. One estimate from over a decade ago situates these units
as representing seventy-five percent of the United States' affordable rental
housing stock.20 As I note ahead, this mainstay of affordable housing stock
is disappearing: at risk before the pandemic hit, and further weakened by
the worsening economic instability of the renters who occupy it.
B. Who Are the Small Landlords?
Small landlords are defined variously, usually in relationship to the num-
ber or configuration of units that they own in total, or to the importance of
the owner's housing investment portfolio to the owner's income. Owners
of buildings of one to five units are overwhelmingly individual investors.
Single-family homes in Baltimore and Cleveland constitute over sixty per-
cent of properties owned by landlords interviewed for a small study of
property owners in Baltimore, Cleveland, and Dallas, with eighty percent
of the properties built before 1960.21 Most small landlords own directly,
and they are less likely to have sheltered themselves from personal liability
16. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Tenants Largely Stay Current on Rent, for Now, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2020) (citing lower collection rates for "NOAH" buildings with poorer
tenants; describing anecdotally the plight of an individual owner of rental single-family
homes in Boston, who rented at below-market rates, and had to sell her units because she
could not keep up with mortgage, tax and maintenance without rent).
17. Paul Brophy & Carey Shea, Opinion: Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing is Hid-
ing in Plain Sight, SHELTERFORCE (July 22, 2019), https://shelterforce.org/2019/07/22
/opinion-naturally-occurring-affordable-housing-is-hiding-in-plain-sight.
18. Haisten Willis, Preserving Affordable Housing: A Look at Programs Designed to Sta-
bilize Communities, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/realestate/the-noah-conundrum-maintaining-the-lifeboat-for-affordable-rental-housing
/2020/03/18/e3el8aa6-12ba-llea-bf62-eadd5dllf559_story.html.
19. Brophy & Shea, supra note 17.
20. Willis, supra note 18 (referring to Harvard's Joint Center on Housing Studies as
the source for this figure); see JT. CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD., HARV. U., AMERICA'S RENTAL
HOUSING-MEETING CHALLENGES, BUILDING OPPORTUNITY 24, fig.18 (2011), https://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/americasrentalhousing-2011.pdf. A contact
at the Joint Center confirmed that this was the last time that the Joint Center had pub-
lished figures on the proportion of affordable housing that is unsubsidized. E-mail from
James Chaknis, Harv. Jt. Ctr. for Housing Studies (June 22, 2020) (on file with author).
21. GARBODEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
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through adoption of an entity.22 To some degree, small landlords resemble
their tenants in race and ethnicity, with a slight edge in Black, Latinx, and
immigrant ownership.23 Data are hard to come by on whether small land-
lords enjoy the huge advantage over tenants in representation in landlord-
tenant court that their larger counterparts do.24
Small owners in general probably rest somewhere in between one
description of them as the "battered but unsung heroes of the fight to
preserve housing for the poor,"25 and the prototypically predatory, profit-
seeking owner. Matthew Desmond and Nathan Wilmers characterize the
landlord-tenant relationship in segregated neighborhoods of concentrated
poverty as historically exploitative, with owners who profit from charg-
ing near-market rents for housing of last resort, for properties with mini-
mal physical maintenance and low tax burdens.26 Small landlords do not
escape their critique. In Evicted, Desmond writes memorably of Sherrena
Tarver, a Milwaukee landlord, "small" in the size of her company (herself
and her husband) but closer to midrange in her portfolio (thirty-six single
family homes, some split up into apartments rented to multiple families at
one time). Her tenants wrangle concessions from her, such as reduced rent
in return for performing amateur unlicensed maintenance jobs. But when-
ever Sherrena decides that it is no longer in her interest to let the rent slide,
the tenant is gone.27
Until recently, Desmond's depiction of Sherrena Tarver notwithstand-
ing, not much has been written in academic literature about landlords in
22. AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING 2020, supra note 12, at 17-18 (attributing 77% of
ownership of buildings with 2-4 units to individual owners, and 59% of large multi-
family buildings to pass-through entities).
23. URB. INST., SMALL MULTIFAMILY UNITS 13 (May 2020), https://www.urban.org
/sites/default/files/2020/05/15/small_multifamilyunits_0.pdf. A study of 127 land-
lords in Baltimore, Cleveland, and Dallas, many of them owners of single-family rentals
and small buildings, found that forty percent of the landlords in the three-city cohort
were Black, and thirteen percent were non-Black minorities. GARBODEN, ET AL., supra note
14, at 10. For more on this study, see infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
24. Comparisons of use of counsel for landlords and for tenants tend to focus on data
city by city. See, e.g., STOUT RISIUS ROuS, LLC, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EVICTION
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN BALTIMORE CITY 10 (May 8, 2020) https://www.abell.org/sites
/default/files/files/Baltimore%20RTC%20Report_FINAL_5_8_2020.pdf (stating that
tenants lack representation in eviction case filings in Baltimore City ninety-nine percent
of the time, and landlords lack representation four percent of the time).
25. Irving Welfeld, Poor Tenants, Poor Landlords, Poor Policy, 92 PUB. INT. 110, 116 (1988).
26. Matthew Desmond & Nathan Wilmers, Do the Poor Pay More for Rental Housing?
Exploitation, Profit, and Risk in Rental Markets, 124 AM. J. SOC. 1090, 1103 (2019) (defining
"exploitation rates" as ratio of rent to property tax assessment); id at 1112 (noting that
owners' profits increase in low-cost markets with high poverty rates, where properties
rank in the tenth percentile of value).
27. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 10-13
(2016) (describing Sherrena Tarver's shrewd assessment of the inner-city housing market
as a profitable business investment).
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general, or small landlords in particular.28 The controlling narratives about
landlord-tenant relationships, and about landlords as rational, profit-
seeking market actors, are drawn from decades-old information about
urban housing markets.29 This picture changed slightly in 2018, when HUD
published a study to which I have referred earlier, that was based on inter-
views with 127 landlords and property owners in Baltimore, Cleveland,
and Dallas, many of them "mom-and-pop" owners.30 Several articles that
have ensued from this data set reach different conclusions and somewhat
complicate the stock narrative.
The authors of the inaugural study characterized the owners in Balti-
more and Cleveland as "small, amateur landlords with limited access to
capital and limited business acumen"3 ' who entered into real estate owner-
ship as a hedge against insecure employment and uncertain retirements.
They do their own repairs, a problematic practice given the age of the
housing stock. Their incomes from their properties are only as stable as
the unstable incomes of their tenants. To cope with the escalating costs of
utilities, especially water, some skimp on all but the most essential mainte-
nance.32 Evictions mean a fallow period of turnover, without rent and with
the hazards attendant on vacant properties. These owners appreciate pay-
ing, quiescent tenants and value stability beyond all else. They will accept
some rent rather than none. The authors describe their situation as one in
which "instability and fear of the future . .. is endemic."'
That said, the very same owners, depicted by one study as flounder-
ing amid ad hoc strategies to keep tenants in place, have been character-
ized in a subsequent assessment as engaged in serial eviction filings as a
calculated business practice.' Serial evictions, defined as multiple filings
against individual tenants, with compounding late fees and court fees,
have been attributed to larger owners in other markets as a means of
enforcing rental discipline.35 So whether as a business model or an ad hoc
practice, small landlords employ this device as well, to exact rental pay-
28. Desmond and Wilmers acknowledge as much. Desmond & Wilmers, supra note
26, at 1093 (commenting that landlords are "conspicuously absent" from sociologists'
studies of urban rental housing markets).
29. GARBODEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 8.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 17 (noting that the cost of water service increased by fifty percent nationally
between 2010 and 2017, and that the landlords in this study compensated for turnover
and other escalating costs by stinting on maintenance and ramping up their screening of
prospective tenants).
33. Id. at 14.
34. Philip Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of Evic-
tion, 18 CITY & CMTY. 638 (2019).
35. Michelle D. Layser, Edward W. DeBarbieri, Andrew J. Greenlee, Tracy A. Kaye
& Blaine G. Saito, Mitigating Housing Instability During a Pandemic (Univ. Ill. Coll. Law
Legal Stud., Rsch. Paper No. 20-15 (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
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ment short of actually taking tenants to court. Studies of selected housing
markets suggest that larger owners engage in other significantly destabi-
lizing landlord-tenant practices in which small landlords may less conspic-
uously take part. Larger owners benefit from most tenants' unfamiliarity
with landlord-tenant procedures by claiming default money judgments
against tenants for fees and costs, and then garnishing tenants' wages.36
Large owners take greater advantage of corporate ownership forms, which
have earned opprobrium as enabling, or emboldening, owners to get away
with poor maintenance. LLCs also obscure owners' and investors' identi-
ties, a benefit which some larger landlords have gone to great lengths to
conserve.38
It is possible that property managers acting on behalf of larger owners
account for their use of a range of predatory strategies.39 It is also possible
that, most of the time, it is simply too difficult to identify and document
small owners who do the same. One small study does not a generalization
make. At the very least, findings from HUD's three-city study imply that
residential rental property ownership varies enormously from locality to
locality and that owners vary from distressed to ruthlessly profit-taking.
Combined with information from other studies on the race and income of
tenants in small unsubsidized buildings, these findings suggest a housing
supply that was already tenuous is now even more at risk.
.cfm?abstract_id=3613789 (describing large landlords as more likely to use techniques
such as serial evictions to regulate tenants).
36. Any large-scale rental owner who wants to evade notoriety for questionable
real estate practices likely should not have married the daughter of the President of the
United States. The Kushner Companies' extensive mid-range residential rental housing
stock takes advantage of a market for low-wage workers in Baltimore County, Maryland,
which does not have a housing authority or public housing. Alec McGillis, Jared Kush-
ner's Other Real Estate Empire in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2017 (Magazine), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/05 /23 /magazine/jared-kushners-other-real-estate-empire
.html (describing the Kushner Companies' strategy of buying deteriorating mid-range
residential rental properties, and treating tenancies as an income stream derived from late
fees, costs, and wage garnishments).
37. See Adam Travis, The Organization of Neglect: Limited Liability Companies and Hous-
ing Disinvestment, 84 AM. Soc. REV. 142 (2019); James Horner, Code Dodgers: Landlord Use
of LLCs and Housing Code Enforcement, 37 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 647 (2019).
38. Alec MacGillis, Kushner Companies Loses a Key Motion in Class Action Filed by
Baltimore Tenants, PROPUBLICA (July 23, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article
/kushner-companies-loses-a-key-motion-in-class-action-filed-by-baltimore
-tenants?utm source=citylab-daily&silverid=MzEwMTkyMjYMjQzSO (describing the
denial of a motion to seal ownership records filed by Westminster Management, the real
estate management arm of the Kushner Companies. Westminster Management sought
to remove a lawsuit brought by its tenants in Baltimore from Circuit Court for Baltimore
City to federal district court in Manhattan, a strategy for which it needed to reveal the
identity and location of investors in order to prove diversity jurisdiction).
39. See, e.g., Daniel Immergluck et al., Evictions, Large Owners, and Serial Filings: Find-
ings from Atlanta, 35 HOUSING STUD. 903, 907 (2020).
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No one keeps records on small landlords' rent collections, in or out of
crisis. So we do not know for sure how they are weathering the pandemic.4 0
We can extrapolate their degree of pain from anecdotes and from what we
know about how small landlords run their businesses. Some small land-
lords have attempted to work with their tenants, a behavior we have seen
as landlords favor stability over eviction even in more normal times.4 '
Some landlords have evaded the eviction moratoria altogether;4 2 some
have defied them in court. 4 National data confirm that small landlords
rely heavily on the rental income from their units." As observed in the
Baltimore-Cleveland-Dallas tudy, when tenants are at risk, small landlords
are at risk: more than half of the renters at risk of losing jobs during the
pandemic rent in single-family homes or small buildings.45 Small landlords
often manage their own buildings, older housing stock for which repairs
mount up.4 6 As owners without employees, small andlords were ineligible
40. Christie Moffatt, Small Multifamily Owners Struggle with Eviction Moratorium
as Tenants Face An Uncertain Future, BISNOW (July 14, 2020), https://www.bisnow.com
/national/news/ multifamily/ small-multifamily-owners-struggle-with-eviction
-moratorium-as-tenants-face-an-uncertain-future-105182 (noting that small landlords do
not belong to trade associations such as the National Multifamily Housing Council, so
they are not included in its tracking of its members' losses in rental income); see also D.C.
ACT 23-317, supra note 15 (exempting owners of fewer than five units from mandatory
extension of payment plans to delinquent tenants).
41. Moffatt, supra note 40 (quoting owners and managers of variously sized proper-
ties as saying that they would not evict tenants as long as tenants communicated their
situations to them).
42. Matthew Goldstein, Landlords Jump the Gun as Eviction Moratorium Wanes, N.Y.
TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/business/evictions
-moratorium-cares-act.html.
43. See Complaint and Request for Preliminary Injunction, Apartment Ass'n of Los
Angeles County, Inc. v. Garcetti, No: 2:20-cv-05193 (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2020), https://
aagla.org/wp-content /uploads/2020/06/Complaint-for-Declaratory-Injunctive-Relief
.pdf (alleging that the city's moratorium on evictions and on rent increases violates the
Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, among other causes of action);
see also Christie Moffat, Texas Multifamily Owners File Lawsuit Against CARES Act Evic-
tion Moratorium, BISNOW (June 29, 2020), https://www.bisnow.com/houston/news
/multifamily/texas-multifamily-owners-file-lawsuit-against-cares-act-eviction-morato-
rium-105009 (describing suit filed on June 24, 2020, for declaratory relief, alleging that the
moratorium on evictions imposed by the CARES Act, Section 4024, violates constitution-
ally guaranteed rights of access to state courts, of contract, of due process, and of equal
protection).
44. Sanheep Bordia, Jasraj Vadya & Aleksandra Firstenko, Covid-19 Relief Helps
Some, Leaves Other Households Vulnerable (2020), https://www.amherstcapital.com
/documents/20649/0/Amherst+Market+Commentary+-+May+2020+Issue/b652
0038-308f-4708-8ed5-3b678d8ed560.
45. Airgood-Obrycki & Hermann, supra note 12.
46. GARBODEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 10; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RENTAL HOUS-
ING FINANCE SURVEY, TABLE CREATOR, 2018 NATIONAL-OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
(2018).
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for support from the Paycheck Protection Program, though they may have
qualified for assistance from state and local governments. Threatened with
loss of income, they have joined the chorus for enhanced rent supplements
to the Covid-unemployed. 7
Assuming that many owners on the low end need any rent, rather than
none, Ron Lieber addresses the "cliff" head-on by prescribing "Ten Steps
to Take to Try to Prevent Your Own Eviction." The key message for ten-
ants is that help is not on the way, but that features of the tenant-landlord
relationship itself offer many points for self-help and leverage. Steps 4 and
5 involve negotiation with the landlord, focusing on small landlords in
particular. Lieber advises tenants in small buildings owned by individual
landlords to focus on a source of power that renters do not assume that
they have: that their rent constitutes "a significant percentage of someone's
income." 48 His recommendation reflects what the studies confirm: the pan-
demic sealed a pre-existing unhealthy relationship, trapping owners and
renters in a dance in which neither can afford to let go.
III. The Housing Crisis Before the Housing Crisis:
The Predicate to Precarity
The pandemic is frequently described as exposing and exacerbating every
gulf, divide, and inequity in American society, almost all of them race and
ethnicity-based: between those who zoom at home to those who work in
fulfillment centers, nursing homes, and meat-packing plants;4 9 between
those who pick up curbside carryout and those who wait in line at food
banks.50 Persons of color, already disproportionately under-employed and
47. See, e.g., Nena Perry-Brown, A Small Landlords Trade Group Calls for Emergency
Rental Assistance in DC, URBANTURF (July 24, 2020), https://dc.urbanturf.com/articles
/blog/dcs-small-landlords-trade-group-calls-for-emergency-rental-assistance/ 17100
(describing the newly organized D.C. Small Multifamily Owners Association, represent-
ing owners of between four and fifty units, which has joined the chorus requesting rent
supplements for tenants, relief from the emergency obligation to extend a statutory pay-
ment plan, and the creation of an Emergency Eviction Diversion Program).
48. Ron Lieber, Your Money: Ten Steps to Take to Try to Prevent Your Own Eviction, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2020), https: / /www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/your-money/coronavirus
-eviction-prevention-renters-landlord.html (quoting Whitney Airgood-Obrycki, Urban
Institute, that a loss of small-scale ownership of small buildings will endanger a major
source of affordable housing).
49. See, e.g., Eric Schlosser, America's Slaughterhouses Aren't Just Killing Animals, ATLAN-




50. See, e.g., Malia Wollan, At the San Antonio Food Bank. the Cars Keep Coming, N.Y.TMES
(May 26, 2020) (Magazine), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/26
/magazine/coronavirus-san-antonio-unemployment-jobs.html (describing residents lin-
ing up in their cars at 8:30 pm the night before the San Antonio Food Bank would start
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under-housed, were positioned to be disproportionately injured.51 Pre-
pandemic, that injury was already acute in the distribution of housing that
is "affordable" and "available."5 2
A. "Affordable" and "Available": The Housing That Exists
for the Increasingly Few
"Affordable" is widely accepted as meaning a rent set at 30% of household
income.53 A renting household paying more than 30% is "cost-burdened,"
a designation that applied to 47.5% of all renters before the pandemic.
Also preceding the pandemic: 25% of renters in the United States spent
more than 50% of their income on rent.54 According to the studies, 52.9%
of renters with "worst case housing needs,"5 5 the most severely burdened
of all, were persons of color. 56 While Black households account for 19% of
all rental households, they represent 26% of all renters at "extremely low
income," that is, with household income below 30% of the area median.57
Forecasts of the evictions likely to be precipitated by the pandemic draw
from these predictors of housing instability, all of which were well in place
in the "before times": source and amount of income, housing cost burden,
and race. They also take into account the impact of stimulus, enhanced
distributing groceries at 9:00 am; the Bank distributed 1.5 million pounds of food to resi-
dents in 10,000 cars).
51. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Robert Gebeloff, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Will Wright &
Mitch Smith, The Fullest Look Yet at the Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020),
https: / /www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05 /us/coronavirus-latinos-african
-americans-cdc-data.html (summarizing data-extracted through litigation-from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, showing that Black and Latinx residents
were three times as likely as whites to be infected with the virus, and almost two times
as likely to die from it).
52. NICOLE ELSASSER WATSON ET AL., HUD OFFICE OF POL'Y, DE. & RES., WORST CASE
HOUSING NEEDS: 2019 REPORT TO CONGRESS 21 (June 2020), https://www.huduser.gov
/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/worst-case-housing-needs-2020.pdf ( efining "afford-
able" as based on thirty percent of income, and "available" as actually occupied by a
renter at very low income). The usable housing supply is further reduced by the paucity
of units that also meet the definition of "adequate," as including physical characteristics
such as plumbing, electricity and heat. For further explanation of "adequate," see id.at
81, App. E.
53. Id. at 21.
54. AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING 2020, supra note 12 at 26.
55. Renters with "worst case housing needs" are those with household incomes
below fifty percent of area median, referred to as "very low income"; who do not receive
rental assistance, who pay more than fifty percent of household income for rent, or who
live in inadequate housing conditions. WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 52, at vii.
56. Id. at 6.
57. ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL, DANIEL THREET, IKRA RAFI & DIANE YENTEL,
NAT'L Low INC. HOUSING COALITION, THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 2
(Mar. 2020), https:/ /reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2020.pdf.
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and state unemployment payments, and their expiration.58 Imperfectly
delivered as they were, these massive income supplements forestalled loss
of home for many.59 Once these supports lapse, the most vulnerable rent-
ers will return, jobless, to the steady state of precarious situations. These
households had no rainy-day funds to shore up their balance sheets, even
before their earners lost their jobs.
"Available" defines a shrinking subset of affordable housing. In the
years immediately leading up to the pandemic, housing insecurity became
more egalitarian: it began to affect renters previously considered to be
"middle class." 60 This phenomenon resulted from an increased supply of
high-end, amenity-rich rentals, with higher income households revert-
ing to rentership in significant numbers between 2010 and 2018.61 None
of this increase in supply has "trickled down." Much of it has exhausted
the capacity of the home-building industry to expand the housing supply.
Middle-income renters now crowd out low-income renters in units that lie
at the edge of affordability for low-income renters, but that fit somewhat
comfortably within middle incomes.62
Housing researchers have documented a vertiginous loss in housing
affordable to households with incomes at 30% and 50% of area median
income. Under one definition, the housing economy lost four million
"affordable" units-units renting at under $600 a month and therefore
affordable to households with annual incomes of under $24,000-between
1990 and 2017. Three of the four million dropped out between 2012 and
2017. Between 1990 and 2017, units renting at over $1000 accounted for
95% of the growth in all rental housing stock.63
58. See Benfer et al., supra note 6 (explaining the basis for the authors' estimate of
numbers of renters likely to be evicted in the next few months).
59. See, e.g., Zachary Parolin, Megan A. Curran & Christopher Wimer, The CARES Act
and Poverty in the Covid-19 Crisis, 4 POVERTY & Soc. POL'Y BRIEF, no.8, at 8 (June 21, 2020),
https: / / staticl.squarespace.com/static/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/5eefa346315
3d0544b7f08b4/ 1592763209062/Forecasting-Poverty-Estimates-COVID19-CARES-Act
-CPSP-2020.pdf (finding that, if distributed to all residents who qualify for them, the
CARES Act's Recovery Rebates and enhanced unemployment benefits would reduce the
poverty rate to pre-pandemic levels).
60. AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING 2020, supra note 12, at 4.
61. Id. at 8-9.
62. AURAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 4 (stating that of 7.3 million homes affordable to
renters with very low incomes, middle income renters are occupying 400,000, and renters
with incomes above the median are occupying 900,000).
63. ELIZABETH LA JEUNESSE ET AL., JT. CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD. HARV., DOCUMENTING
THE LONG-RUN DECLINE IN Low COST HOUSING UNITS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Sept. 2019),
https:/ /www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvardjchslossof_lowcost
rental_housing_la jeunesse_2019_0.pdf.
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B. Double Precarity: Small Landlords, Their Tenants, and Their
Ecosystem of Instability
The Alexa Mall in Berlin is open for business. Toni Kehler is shopping for a
new HD-TV. Toni is not concerned about whether he has the wherewithal
to cover this discretionary purchase. Since the beginning of the pandemic,
the German government and other governments in the Eurozone have
paid employers directly to keep their workers on at reduced salaries.64
Alexis Herdez was laid off, after one day of work, from her job at a
bridal clothing store. She filed for unemployment compensation in Ken-
tucky. Kentucky's automated phone system directed her to a queue, from
which she never received any human contact or information. After two
months, she received an appointment to meet with staff at the unemploy-
ment agency in August. She and her husband are struggling with rent and
car payments.65 John Jolley slept in his car to be first in line to receive a
ticket, which would gain him entry to an appointment in a convention cen-
ter at a mass claims processing event held by the Oklahoma Employment
Security Commission. His unemployment claim was approved in March,
but he has yet o see a check.66 Ms. Herdez and Mr. Jolley are facing the
"cliff."
We know why landlords have not received rent. Our state-based unem-
ployment compensation is one of many faltering remnants of the New
Deal's cooperative federalism, which gave states two types of leeway:
(1) to set levels of support to beneficiaries, and (2) to manage the offices
that are supposed to serve them. States stint on both.67 We underfund and
make bureaucratically punishing the mechanisms of unemployment com-
pensation that could provide a buffer against this instability. To tie income
security to laid-off wage earners' ability to navigate an opaque unemploy-
ment insurance bureaucracy on their own, rather than automatically to
64. Liz Alderman, As Europe's Economies Reopen, Consumers Go on a Spending Spree,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/business/as-europes
-economies-reopen-consumers-go-on-a-spending-spree.html?searchResultPosition=1.
65. Eli Rosenberg, Workers Are Pushed to the Brink As They Continue to Wait for Delayed
Unemployment Payments, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/2020/07/13/unemployment-payment-delays.
66. Annie Gowen, A Very Dark Feeling: Hundreds Camp out in Oklahoma Unemployment
Lines, WASH. POST (July 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-very
-dark-feeling-hundreds-camp-out-in-oklahoma-unemployment-lines/2020/07/20/44d5
9cb6-c77a-11ea-a99f-3bbdffblaf38_story.html.
67. Id. (noting that Oklahoma's Employment Security Commission processes claims
through a 1978 mainframe computer); GEORGE WENTWORTH, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT,
CLOSING DOORS ON THE UNEMPLOYED 1 (Dec. 2017), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content
/uploads/Closing-Doors-on-the-Unemployedl2_19_17-1.pdf (noting, as of 2017, that
since the Great Recession, states had cut back sharply on unemployment compensation
through a combination of decreased benefits, decreased number of weeks of benefits, and
more frequent denials of claims for technical reasons).
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subsidize employers to avoid laying employees off at all, is a policy that
passively follows past practice, and that guarantees instability.
Our economy of work in the United States is constructed to generate
and perpetuate instability. Employment has become inherently unstable.
Kathryn Edin and Luke Shaefer have chronicled a prepandemic sociology
of work, a bare survival mode in which unpredictable fluctuations in hours
prevent low-wage and middle-class workers from setting any money aside
for emergencies.68 Without resources for an emergency, workers were left
vulnerable to physical displacement and personal upheaval through evic-
tion or foreclosure. Desmond and Gershenson have described low-wage
workers as suffering from a "double precarity" in which unstable housing
and its loss link to loss of income.69
These conditions have continued as the terms of shelter and work for
the "essential worker" of the pandemic. While the abrupt tumble of mil-
lions of Americans into joblessness this spring may be anomalous, the pre-
pandemic truth is that housing stability for millions of Americans teetered
from paycheck to precarious paycheck. The instability of the affordable
housing market compounds the instability of low-wage work. The house-
holds with "worst-case housing needs" got that way as a result of the stew
of historical racial disparity in wealth and assets, and of the fluctuations in
income that make putting something aside for emergencies impossible.7 0
This brings us back to the one universally acknowledged, and uni-
versally acknowledged to be scarce, remedy for housing precarity: the
income-based rental subsidy. The importance of vouchers, public housing,
and state-based housing supplements derives from their predictability:
income may fluctuate, but rent will rarely be more than what, by accepted
calculations, a household can afford to pay without stinting on food, heat,
or water. Subsidy ties rent directly to a tenant's income. Stability for the
renter also means stability for the landlord. As the researchers in the three-
city HUD study noted, small owners, in particular, value housing choice
vouchers for the predictability that they offer in terms of income. When
they reject voucher holders, they primarily are rejecting the relationship
with the housing authority's bureaucracy, with its unpredictable inspec-
tions and opaque standards for housing quality. 7'
68. KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING
IN AMERICA 35-42 (2015) (describing how a mother of two traveled by bus from her fam-
ily's third homeless shelter in ten months to report by 7 a.m. to her job cleaning vacant,
unheated apartment buildings, offices, and foreclosed homes; and how her hours were
cut to nothing as illness from exposure to cold and mold forced her to miss work).
69. Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Housing and Employment Insecurity Among
the Working Poor, 63 Soc. PROBS. 46,47 (2016).
70. AURAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 7 (describing how a family of four, with monthly
income of $1,928, has $87 remaining after spending $1194.50 for fair-market rent for a
two-bedroom apartment, and $647 on the USDA's thrifty food budget).
71. GARBODEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 26.
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Yet the funds, and the will, to bridge the gap between incomes and
rent, are lacking. Of every four low-income households that are eligible
for some federal housing subsidy, one gets that subsidy? Put another way:
the three out of four renter households that do not receive subsidies are
subject to the full force of precarity. Rental assistance carries with it the
security not only of knowing that one's rent will not (or should not) outrun
one's resources, but of knowing that the renter may predict some stability
in place over time.
IV. Cancel the Rent? Rather, Some Modest Proposals for
Bolstering the "NOAH" Sector of Affordable Housing
As Amna Akbar has noted, the campaigns to "cancel the rent" arise from
more than a perception of what is needed, now, to meet the current emer-
gency. "Cancel the rent" means cancel the contract: justice requires soci-
ety's acknowledgment that housing is too foundational to be left as "the
product of a private contract about private property" More than a slogan,
"cancel the rent" is a policy that recognizes the straight line between com-
modification of housing and housing insecurity.
Who among the primary providers of unsubsidized, below-market rate
housing can absorb a cancellation, not merely a deferral, of the predomi-
nant source of funds for maintenance of that housing? "NOAH" units are
an afterthought of U.S. housing policy. Our system provides largely affir-
mative incentives to the large owner-investors for creating or sustaining
affordable units. We offer tax relief, in the form of credits and property
tax abatements. This option provides affordability, but not stability; with-
out the imposition of other controls, the compulsion to maintain afford-
able rents expires within ten to fifteen years. We offer release from density,
height, and other restrictions in exchange for a small percentage of units to
be made affordable to renter households with incomes at a percentage of
the area median. But we provide few or no incentives to the smallest land-
lords to continue, with modest rents and adequate maintenance.
When we subsidize investors with little or no tie to the physical plant in
which they are investing, we get affordability that is ephemeral and expen-
sive. Here are a couple of examples of investment, direct and indirect, that
72. WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 52, at 18; Will Fischer & Barbara Sard,
Chartbook: Federal Housing Spending Is Poorly Matched to Need, CTR. ON BUDGET & PoL'Y
PRIORITIES (Mar. 8, 2017), https:/ /www.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-federal
-housing-spending-is-poorly-matched-to-need. These sources do not distinguish federal
subsidies from state or local. Note that eligibility for below-market units financed by the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) ties to a tenant's income, but a tenant's rent in
that unit does not. Rents in LIHTC units concededly are not affordable to the poorest of
the poor.
73. Amna Akbar, The Left is Remaking the World, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/ 11 /opinion/sunday/defund-police-cancel-rent.html.
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stabilize low to moderate income households, in small buildings and in
their communities.
A. Fund Plant, Not Profits: Keeping Small Landlords Afloat
A few localities have propped up small landlords directly, by subsidizing
the cost of physical plant. The District of Columbia's Small Buildings Grant
Program pays up to $25,000 per rental unit, for buildings of five to twenty
units, for "essential repairs": to replace heating and cooling systems, roofs,
windows, and plumbing. The goal is to prevent, not punish, housing code
violations. Seventy-five percent of the units must be occupied, and half of
the units must be affordable to residents with incomes below eighty per-
cent of the area median, requirements that covenants will enshrine in the
property's deeds for five years. Successful applicants must attend a day-
and-a-half-long property-management course.74
Pittsburgh's Small Landlord Fund is for the truly "small": it covers
buildings of between one and five units. Applicants receive three-percent
loans for the rehabilitation of existing rental units, or for the conversion
of vacant units for rental. Owners must commit themselves to renting to
households with incomes under eighty percent of area median, or to house-
holds holding vouchers. The payout period is ten to fifteen years, with the
longest term reserved for units currently rented by residents whose income
is below eighty percent of area median and who do not hold vouchers.75
B. Getting from NOAH to NORC: Supporting the Owner-Occupants of Limited
Equity Cooperatives as Providers of Affordable Housing
Several of my colleagues and I began our legal careers as litigation attor-
neys with civil legal aid offices, representing low-income tenants in evic-
tion defense. We are concluding our legal careers, in part, as transactional
attorneys, representing small landlords in their business affairs. If you had
told me forty years ago that this change would happen, I never would have
believed you.
But then I never would have believed that tenants could become own-
ers and that tenant-owners could manage their homes by the consent and
direction of the owner-managed. A network of tenant-owners, non-profit
housing providers and technical support specialists, attorneys, organiz-
ers, lawyers, housing counselors, and law students supports limited equity
housing cooperatives (LECs), a lode of affordable housing in the District of
Columbia.76 The District's ninety-six LECs contain 4300 units of housing
74. D.C. Dep't Hous. & Cmty. Dev., Small Building Program, https://dhcd.dc.gov
/page/small-building-program (last visited July 24, 2020).
75. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, Small Landlord Fund Application,
https:/ /www.ura.org/media/W1siZilsljlwMjAvMDMvMTkvN2hxYmZrM2FdF9T
bWFsbF9MTF9GdW5kXFwcC5GaWxsYWJsZV8xXy5wZGYiXV /Small % 20LL%20
Fund%20App.Fillable%20%281%29.pdf (last visited July 20, 2020).
76. For a study of the networking and support among actors within the D.C. Pres-
ervation Network, in which members of this group participate, see Kathryn Howell,
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affordable to shareholder-owners with incomes of under eighty percent of
the area median. The average size of each LEC-owned building is forty-
four units, but over half the buildings have fewer than twenty-five. LECs
enable residents with moderate incomes to live in upper income neighbor-
hoods: forty-five perecent of the buildings and thirty percent of the units
of LECs are located in census tracts with incomes greater than the District's
median." The residents are economically, racially, and ethnically diverse.78
The majority of these buildings converted to cooperative tenant owner-
ship as a result of the District of Columbia's Tenant Opportunity to Pur-
chase Act (TOPA).79 As part of the legislative response to tenant activism
against mass evictions and increases in rent during the 1970s, TOPA was
designed to provide stability: to give residents first call at purchasing their
dwellings, a hedge against apartment-flipping in the 1970s.80 TOPA proved
to be a sturdy mechanism to stabilize low income rental households once
again, in the early 2000s, when the District poured funds into subsidizing
the infrastructure and retail near the new Columbia Heights Metro station.
Tenants' use of TOPA was instrumental in preserving 2100 units of housing
affordable to households at thirty percent of area median income.8'
The working definition of LEC-"resale restricted housing in which
occupants hold an ownership stake"82-sets de-commodification of hous-
ing as the groundwork for this stability. The agency in the District that is the
primary public funder of the purchase and rehabilitation of these TOPA-
inspired homeownership units enforces income limitations through afford-
ability covenants;8 3 the cooperatives' boards impose resale restrictions
Housing and the Grassroots: Using Local and Expert Knowledge to Preserve Affordable Housing,
38 J. PLANNING, EDUC. & RES. 437 (2018).
77. For these data points about LECs in the District of Columbia, see KATHRYN How-
ELL, SCOTT BRUTON & ANNA CLEMENS, CREATING AND SUSTAINING LIMITED EQUITY
COOPERATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10-16 (Feb. 2020) https://www.cnhed.org
/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Creating-and-Sustaining-Limited-Equity-Cooperatives
-in-Washington-DCFINAL.pdf.
78. Id. at 28 (describing members' meetings at which as many as three languages are
spoken).
79. D.C. CODE §42.3404.01-13 (2020); HOWELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 1.
80. For an overview of the history of the tenants' campaign which produced the
Rental Housing Act of 1980, of which TOPA was a part, see Amanda Huron, Creating a
Commons in the Capitol: The Emergence of Limited-Equity Cooperatives in Washington, D.C., 26
WASH. HIST. 56, 59-60 (2014); see also Aaron O'Toole & Benita Jones, Tenant Purchase Laws
as a Tool for Affordable Housing Preservation, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 367
(2009) (describing the rationale for and mechanics of the District's Tenant Opportunity to
Purchase Program).
81. Kathryn Howell, Building Empowerment in Market-Based Redevelopment: Changing
Paradigms for Affordable Housing and Community Development in Washington, DC, 52 CMTY.
DEV. J. 573, 574 (2017).
82. JOHN EMMAEUS, NAT'L HOUSING INST., SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP 2 (2006).
83. See D.C. CODES 42-2802.2(a), (b) (requiring a forty-year affordability restriction on
rental units, and a 180-month restriction on sales units, built with the Housing Production
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through their subscription agreements, occupancy agreements, and corpo-
rate bylaws.84 It is common to see not only "NOAHs" among the District's
ninety-six LECs, but NORCs (Naturally Occurring Retirement Communi-
ties). These are the buildings whose residents have aged in place, some liv-
ing there since, as tenants, they organized to purchase them, some since the
activation of TOPA itself. Several members of one of our LEC client boards
have resided in their units, first as renters and then as owners, since 1979.
They are all retired now, managing on their fixed incomes, keeping the cor-
porate account balance just high enough to pay for taxes and utilities.
LECs give low- to moderate-income households both managerial and
economic control of where they dwell. The cooperative corporation is the
owner, with each resident shareholder a member. Each member's coopera-
tive share buys the right to occupancy, a vote, and a stake in the welfare of
the cooperative enterprise. As my colleague Professor Louise Howells, a
leader in the movement to support LECs, has written, when tenants take
ownership of their housing, the transformation "creates a structural rever-
sal of the tenants' subordinated role." 85
When the District adopted the LEC as its predominant vehicle for tenant
ownership, it brought owners of cooperative units into economic interde-
pendence. Owners of an LEC own not a unit, which was likely unaffordable
to them individually, but an ownership share in the cooperative corpora-
tion that took out the blanket mortgage for the building. This plan means
that one member's failure to pay monthly carrying charges puts everyone's
tenure at risk. The law and principles of cooperative governance ensure
that the burdens and benefits of management decisions are shared equally.
If owners vote not to increase their monthly carrying charges, they retain
more money to meet their individual needs of food and health care. If
they vote to do so, they avoid the consequences of underfunded reserves,
deferred maintenance, and, eventually, deteriorating physical plant.86 The
choice is theirs.
Trust Fund, the District's dedicated fund based on annual yields from recordation and
transfer taxes).
84. D.C. MUN.RECS. tit.14, §2702.3 (2020) (requiring tenants' associations seeking gap
financing for the First Right to Purchase Program to "demonstrate the intent to operate
as a low-yield cooperative, condominium, or tenant-controlled rental property" in their
articles of incorporation or bylaws).
85. Alicia Alvarez, Susan Bennett, Louise Howells & Hannah Lieberman, Teaching and
Practicing Community Development Poverty Law: Lawyers and Clients as Trusted Community
Problem Solvers, 23 CLIN. L. REV. 201, 218 (2017).
86. The theme of unmet physical needs of aging buildings recurs with small LECs in
D.C., as it does with small buildings elsewhere. HOWELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 42-43; see
also DePillis, Lydia, Owning a Building with All Your Friends: Life in a Limited Equity Coop,
WASH. CITY PAPER (May 5,2011), https: / /www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housing
-complex/blog/ 13121846/owning-a-building-with-all-your-friends-life-in-a-limited
-equity-coop (describing experience of being forced to eject friends and neighbors after
their failure to pay carrying charges endangered the financial future of the cooperative).
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As of this writing, no one has analyzed whether the District's LECs are
at financial risk of default because their owners have lost their jobs or have
fallen ill. Given the demographics from which LEC shareholder-owners
come, it is likely that they are vulnerable to the impacts of the pandemic.
But the one vulnerability that they do not suffer is housing precarity. The
interconnectedness of members of an LEC means that they know that they
rise and fall together and that hey cannot not let their neighbors sink. Up to
the point of endangering their mortgage and their tax payments, they have
the option of deferring monthly charges, if not cancelling them. The posi-
tion of owners of an LEC illustrates Desmond's proposition: that between
employment and housing instability, housing is the more disastrous.
C. Modest Proposals to Support the Right to Stay in Place
The interventions that I have just described for the stabilization of small
buildings and NOAH units are just that-interventions. Market forces do
not keep small buildings both habitable and affordable. In a commodi-
fied economy of housing, no "affordable, available, and adequate" units
are "naturally occurring." TOPA opens the space for tenant purchase to
occur, but it does not go so far as to mandate owners to sell to tenants
at below-market prices.87 Therefore, LECs in the District and elsewhere
exist thanks to the city's low-interest loans, bonds, and grants. LECs main-
tain their affordability not only because the city's funds have brought the
monthly cost to shareholders down, but also because the covenants in their
loan documents require them to observe income limits for new residents
and, occasionally, to limit carrying charges. The District also provides tax
abatements and other breaks to LECs, including eligibility for the District's
Small Building Grant.88
Grants and low interest loans to maintain the habitability of small build-
ings are targeted, and work at a small scale. These measures could promote
housing stability for renters even more effectively if they were tied not only
to income eligibility restrictions, but to best practices. Funders could exact
an enhanced "clean hands" requirement for applicants, beyond proof of
basic compliance with taxes, corporate renewals, and registration require-
ments. Non-resident owners of small buildings should demonstrate that
they do not engage in serial filings against tenants. Transparency would
87. See D.C. CODE § 42-3404.03(1) (2020) (requiring that an owner's offer of sale
include the "asking price and material terms of the sale"). But see Parcel One Phase One
Associates, LLP v. Museum Square Tenants' Ass'n, 146 A.3d 394,405 (D.C. 2016) (reject-
ing the owner's offer in 2014 to tenants of the projected value of their apartment com-
plex in 2021, after demolition and reconstruction, as not reasonable to any third-party
purchaser).
88. See D.C. CODE § 47-3503(a)(2)(exempting deeds transferred to housing coopera-
tives from deed recordation tax); id. 947-3503(b)(2) (exempting sales of property to hous-
ing cooperatives from transfer tax); id. §47-3503(c) (3, 4) (exempting housing cooperatives
from property taxes for five years from creation, if half of the households qualify by
federal income guidelines).
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favor priority selection of individual owners, not entities, unless the princi-
pals are disclosed in corporate registration or renewal filings. 89
These interventions are place-based. To build stability into owner-land-
lords' physical plant is to acknowledge that there will never be enough
vouchers to stabilize owner-landlords' incomes. Nothing is more quintes-
sentially place-based than the tenant association that buys its building, so
that no one ever has to move. That said, the place has to be worth stay-
ing in. There is an enormous literature about the historic role that porta-
ble vouchers have played in enabling tenants to "move to opportunity,"90
away from the entrenched poverty and racial segregation that we now
know determine life outcomes at the level of a city block.91 But portability
only works as an opportunity strategy when vouchers pay enough in hot
housing markets and when landlords accept them.92
89. In an action preceded by lapsed legislation to require full disclosure of the names
of investors in any housing-related entity, the District of Columbia modified its corpo-
rate code to require entities to disclose, upon initial registration and renewal, the names,
resident and legal addresses of 10% owners, or of investors with control over financial
or day to day operations. See D.C. ACT 22-616, §3(a) (Jan. 30, 2019) (amending D.C. CODE
§ 29-102.01, 102.11).
90. For a recent reassessment of the outcomes of the Moving to Opportunity program
of the 1990s, see Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to
BetterNeighborhoods on Children:New Evidencefrom theMoving to OpportunityExperiment, 106
AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016); see also MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, AUSTIN NICHOLS & JENNIFER
COMEY, URB. INST., BENEFITS OF LIVING IN HIGH-OPPORTUNITY NEIGHBORHOODS (Sept.
2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32821/412648-Benefits
-of-Living-in-High-Opportunity-Neighborhoods.PDF (speculating on why improve-
ments in outcomes seemed limited after families moved from neighborhoods of high
concentrations of poverty).
91. See, e.g., OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS, https:/ /opportunityinsights.org/paper-category
/neighborhoods/#resource-listing (last visited July 24, 2020) (cataloguing the work of
Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and others on the impacts of neighborhoods and race on
intergenerational mobility).
92. As of August 2020, eighteen states and ninety-five cities had enacted legislation
prohibiting housing discrimination based on the tenant's source of income. POVERTY
& RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM, APPENDIX B: STATE, LOCAL, AND
FEDERAL LAWS BARRING SOURCE-OF-INCOME DISCRIMINATION (Aug. 2020), https://www
.prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf. That states and localities have laws prohibiting land-
lords from refusing to rent to tenants who want to pay with vouchers does not mean that
landlords do not refuse to rent to them. See, e.g., ALISON BELL, BARBARA SARD & BECKY
KOEPNICK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
RENTERS USING HOUSING VOUCHERS IMPROVES RESULTS: LESSONS FROM CITIES AND STATES
THAT HAVE ENACTED SOURCE OF INCOME LAWS 8 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org
/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-10-18hous.pdf (noting that landlords widely ignore
Philadelphia's source of income discrimination law); Office of the Attorney General for
the District of Columbia, AG Racine Sues 16 Real Estate Companies and Professionals for
Illegal Housing Discrimination Against District Voucher Holders (July 23, 2020), https://oag
.dc.gov/release/ag-racine-sues-16-real-estate-companies-and ( nouncing the filing of
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If TOPA succeeds, it is because a city-state once committed itself to sta-
bilizing low to moderate income tenants in places across the city. Under
the pressure of advocacy, and the recognition of the needs of the moment,
that support continues, even as those places become increasingly afflu-
ent. Other jurisdictions have recognized the value of supporting tenant-
ownership, a value that underscores opportunity as the right to stay put,
not as a rapidly appreciating investment.93 If we will not support tenants
individually so that they can stay in place, then we have to think, again,
about what it means to support housing stock in which they can afford to
live, and to support them collectively.
eight lawsuits alleging that defendants openly advertised rental units as unavailable to
tenants using housing vouchers).
93. Steve Dubb, Tenant First Option to Buy Bills Advance in Bay Area, NONPROFIT QTLY
(Feb. 24, 2020), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/tenant-opportunity-to-purchase-bills
-advance-in-san-francisco-bay-area (describing the introduction of TOPA legislation in
the Berkeley and Oakland City Councils).
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